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In the Bottom-Up Review conducted in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, DOD identified the proliferation of nuclear weapons as the new 
primary threat to the national security of the U.S. In response to this new threat, 
the Clinton Administration signaled a shift in emphasis in proliferation policy to 
include counterproliferation as a major policy goal. This thesis examines 
proliferation policy from a resource perspective. After a brief history of past U.S. 
proliferation policy and the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI), the 
Administration's FY 95 budget request for policy support for this new initiative 
is analyzed. The purpose is to provide insight concerning the extent to which a 
consensus on resources for this new initiative exists between the executive and 
legislative branches. The thesis concludes that both the Administration and 
Congress agree that counterproliferation is an appropriate means to deal with the 
new threat. The Senate was supportive of the new initiative throughout the budget 
process, whereas the House was not. However, Congress as a whole increased 
support for the initiative by appropriating $60 million, almost twice the 
Administration's request. There was confusion between the Administration and 
Congress regarding the proper account for funding the initiative. Consequently, 
Congress zeroed the Administration's original request for counterproliferation 
studies in the O&M account, but added back $60 million to the RDT&E account 
for the DCI, indicating that the initiative was more technology oriented and 
required RDT&E funds. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the fall of 
1991, also went the threat that had dominated U.S. defense 
strategy for the previous forty five (45) years. In the 
Bottom-Up Review conducted in the aftermath of the Soviet 
collapse, the Department of Defense identified the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction as a primary threat to the national security of 
the United States in the new world order. In response to this 
new threat, the Clinton Administration has apparently shifted 
emphasis in proliferation policy to include 
counterproliferation or protection measures as a major policy 
goal. This thesis will examine U.S. proliferation policy from 
a resource perspective. It will consist of an analysis of the 
apparent shift in proliferation policy emphasis in the Clinton 
Administration from one focused on nonproliferation through 
deterrence, arms control and prevention, to one focused on 
protection from the threat of the continued proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The 
thesis will focus on President Clinton's request in the FY 
1995 Defense Budget for approximately $30 million for policy 
support of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative. 
Following a brief review of the history of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and of U.S. proliferation 
policy, the thesis will describe the Clinton Administration's 
new emphasis on counterproliferation. To assess the budgeting 
and resource implications of this policy change, the thesis 
will track the President's FY 1995 budget request through the 
congressional budget process, identifying and analyzing all 
problems and changes to the original request. 
The issues surrounding the shift in policy emphasis in 
proliferation  policy  are  particularly  relevant  in  the 
aftermath of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War. The shift in policy emphasis presents 
new challenges to the Department of Defense, and may 
potentially result in new missions for all of the armed 
services. An understanding of the budgetary and resource 
implications of the new emphasis on counterproliferation is 
essential to the successful accomplishment of these new 
missions. 
A.  OVERVIEW 
The destruction of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and 
Nagasaki three (3) days later marked the beginning of the 
nuclear age, and alerted the world to the grim reality and the 
catastrophic consequences of a nuclear war. [Ref. 1] 
U.S. proliferation policy efforts since World War II have 
centered on limiting the global spread of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction. This effort to contain the 
spread of nuclear weapons is called nonproliteration. The 
former Soviet Union has been the primary focus of U.S. 
proliferation policy for approximately the past fifty (50) 
years during the period known as the Cold War. In fact, the 
history of proliferation during the Cold War can best be 
described as an adversarial relationship between the United 
States and the Soviet Union. [Ref. 2] 
The collapse of the Soviet Union effectively ended the 
Cold War. This profoundly affected the international balance 
of power, and complicated the problem of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by 
destablizing control of the arsenal of the former Soviet 
Union. The Administration of President Clinton has recognized 
the potential of an increased proliferation problem as a new 
threat, and has shifted emphasis in proliferation policy to 
include counterproliferation measures such as those outlined 
in the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. 
One indication of this shift in emphasis was the 
President's FY 95 budget request for $30 million for policy- 
support for DOD's Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. 
Action taken on this budget request throughout the 
Congressional budget process provides information regarding 
the shift in emphasis in proliferation policy, and provides 
insight about the extent to which a consensus on this new 
policy exists between the executive and legislative branches, 
as well as the level of resources necessary to implement it. 
B. SCOPE 
This thesis will provide an overview of U.S. 
proliferation policy. It will review the history of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction from the development of the Atomic Bomb in the 
1940's to the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative and the 
President's FY 95 budget request to support that initiative. 
The thesis will evaluate current proliferation policy and 
discuss the budgetary issues and resource implications 
involved in the implementation of this policy. 
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will define U.S. proliferation policy in a 
historical context. President Clinton's FY 95 budget request 
will be used to demonstrate the shift in emphasis in 
proliferation policy in the wake of the collapse of the former 
Soviet Union. Additionally, information and data obtained by 
tracking the President's request through the Congressional 
budget process will be used to analyze Congressional support 
for the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative and to provide 
further insight into the shift in U.S. proliferation policy. 
D.  GOALS 
The primary goal of the thesis is to satisfactorily 
answer the following question: 
• How did Congress change or otherwise impact the 
President's FY 1995 defense budget request for funding 
in support of the Defense Counterproliferation 
Initiative? 
In researching and answering the primary thesis question, the 
following subsidiary questions will be answered: 
• What is meant by proliferation, nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation? 
• What are President Clinton's priorities with regard to 
proliferation policy as evidenced by his FY 95 budget 
request? 
• How do these priorities differ from past proliferation 
policy priorities? 
• What changes were made to the President's budget 
request during the authorization process in both the 
House and the Senate? 
• What changes were made to the request by the House and 
Senate Appropriations Committees? 
• Who were the major proponents and opponents the 
President's budget request? 
• Does the Congress support the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative and the President's new 
proliferation policy priorities? 
• What inferences can be drawn about the future direction 
of U.S. proliferation policy? 
While researching the above questions, the thesis will 
reach and discuss conclusions regarding U.S. proliferation 
policy and suggest possible areas for future research. 
II.  A HISTORY OF U.S. PROLIFERATION POLICY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will provide a brief history and analysis of 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and U.S. proliferation 
policy efforts from the dawn of the nuclear age in the 1940's 
through the end of the Cold War. It will look at the many 
proliferation policy initiatives introduced in the 
international arena during the past fifty (50) years and where 
applicable, discuss their merits, shortcomings and 
implications. The chapter will conclude with a summary of 
past proliferation policy efforts and provide some insight 
into how they positioned the United States to deal with the 
issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction in the wake of the collapse of the 
former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
Before delving into the history and discussion of past 
proliferation policy, it is necessary to define exactly what 
is meant by the terms proliferation, nonproliferation and 
counterproliferation. The Clinton Administration defines 
proliferation, nonproliferation and counterproliferation in 
policy terms as follows [Ref. 3]: 
Proliferation - the spread of nuclear, biological, 
or chemical weapons and the missiles used to 
deliver them. 
Nonproliferation - use of the full range of 
political, economic and military tools to prevent 
proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or protect 
our interests against an opponent armed with 
weapons of mass destruction or missiles, should 
that prove necessary. Nonproliferation tools 
include: intelligence analysis, global 
nonproliferation norms and agreements, diplomacy, 
export controls, security assurances, defenses, and 
the application of military force. 
Counterproliferation - the activities of the 
Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. 
efforts to combat proliferation, including 
diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and 
intelligence collection and analysis, with 
particular responsibility for assuring U.S. forces 
and interests can be protected should they confront 
an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction 
or missiles. 
Counterproliferation and the Defense Counterproliferation 
Initiative will be discussed in detail in Chapter III in the 
context of the Clinton Administration's shift in proliferation 
policy emphasis to include counterproliferation as a major 
policy goal. 
For purposes of this thesis "proliferation policy" will 
refer to and include nonproliferation and counterproliferation 
efforts and initiatives. 
B.  OVERVIEW 
The atomic bomb is the most terrible and 
devastating weapon that man has ever contrived. 
Because atomic energy is capable of destroying 
civilization, it must be controlled by 
international authority. 
- Harry S. Truman 
Hiroshima. Japan. 6 August 1945 
Killed:        78,150 
Injured: 37,425 
Missing:       13,983 
Destroyed:     68,000  buildings 
[Ref. 4] 
Recognition of the potential devastating consequences 
associated with nuclear war gave rise to early proliferation 
concerns. Indeed, proliferation policy has played a prominent 
role in overall U.S. national security policy since the dawn 
of the nuclear age in the 1940's.   It arose out of the 
recognition of the awesome destructive capabilities of the 
atomic bomb, and was shaped largely through Cold War policies 
aimed at the Soviet Union after World War II. Both countries 
kept the other at bay by maintaining their own ability to 
destroy the other in retaliation. Thus, the peace maintained 
between the Soviet Union and the United States throughout the 
Cold War was accomplished primarily through "mutual 
deterrence." 
C.  THE SOVIET THREAT 
The political picture in Europe after World War II looked 
very grim from the Western point of view. The Soviet Union 
was not honoring post-war agreements to allow free elections 
in Europe. Winston Churchill was not reelected for office in 
Great Britain and the Socialists were in control. France and 
Italy both had large Communist parties, and eastern Europe was 
under Soviet control. George Kennan, the Deputy Commandant 
for Foreign Affairs at the National War College, was 
particularly discouraged after a visit to Moscow and became 
convinced that the Soviet Union was totally committed to 
defeating and destroying capitalism. Kennan communicated this 
to Washington, DC in what became known as the "Long Telegram." 
There was a growing consensus in the United States that 
the Soviet Union represented a clear and immediate threat to 
the security of the West. Out of recognition of this threat 
grew the policy of "Containment" of the spread of Communism 
and the beginning of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. The 
policy of Containment recognized the Soviet Union as the other 
dominant power in a bipolar world power structure. The goal 
of Containment in the broadest sense was to keep countries of 
key military-industrial interest to the United States from 
falling under hostile control. Immediately after the war, 
this referred primarily to the defense of western Europe and 
Japan from the Soviet Union. The policy of Containment 
eventually came to include the defense of freedom and 
democracy wherever it was threatened in the world, e.g., Korea 
and Viet Nam. [Ref. 5] 
The recognition of the Soviet Union as the primary, if 
not only, threat to the security interests of the United 
States naturally led to U.S. proliferation policy efforts that 
were primarily focused on the Soviet Union. 
D.  THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 
U.S. proliferation policy efforts since the end of World 
War II and throughout the Cold War era were primarily aimed at 
controlling the global spread of nuclear weapons and became 
known in an institutional sense as the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. [Ref. 6] The table on the 
following page outlines the evolution of the history of the 
nonproliferation regime, most of which will be discussed 
throughout this chapter. 
Table 1 [Ref. 7] 
Kev Events in the History of the Nonproliferation Regime 
1945 U.S drops atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
1946 U.S. adopts McMahon Act; proposes Baruch Plan. 
1949 USSR tests a nuclear explosive. 
1952 Great Britain tests a nuclear explosive. 
1953 U.S. proposes Atoms for Peace. 
1957 IAEA is founded. 
1960 France tests a nuclear explosive. 
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. 
19 63 Limited Test Ban Treaty is signed. 
1964 China tests a nuclear explosive. 
1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco is completed. 
1968 NPT is completed. 
1971 Zangger Committee is formed. 
1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty; SALT 1. 
1974 India tests a nuclear explosive. 
1975 Nuclear Suppliers Group is created. 
1978 U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act is passed. 
1979 SALT II 
19 85 Treaty of Rarotonga is completed. 
1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 
1992 NSG adopts full scope safeguards policy, trigger 
list includes dual use items. 
1993 North Korea threatens to withdraw from the NPT. 
1994 Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. 
1.  Early Proliferation Concerns (1946-1953) 
Early U.S. proliferation policy consisted of the 1946 
Atomic Energy Act (McMahon Act) and the Baruch Plan (also 
drafted in 1946). The 1946 Atomic Energy Act called for 
government control and secrecy to help keep nuclear 
technology, materials, and knowhow under U.S. control. All 
U.S. nuclear activities were nationalized, and the export of 
nuclear materials, technology and knowhow was strictly 
outlawed. These export controls applied to everyone, even 
allies such as Great Britain who was denied continued 
collaboration regarding nuclear technology after the war 
ended. [Ref. 8] 
The Baruch Plan, authored by Bernard Baruch, a 
Presidential representative to the United Nations, was a 
proposal to the United Nations that recommended placing the 
development and use of atomic energy under the control of the 
United Nations Security Council. [Ref. 9] It was an 
ambitious plan that envisioned the end of nuclear weapons 
development and production, and the elimination of all atomic 
weapon stockpiles. 
The Soviet Union was wary of the Baruch Plan and 
distrustful of the United States. The Soviets viewed the plan 
as an attempt by the United States to maintain nuclear 
dominance by locking in its position as the only nation 
capable of producing a nuclear weapon. Thus, the Soviet 
Union rejected the plan and made a separate proposal that 
required the United States to destroy its weapons before any 
international agency was established. Eventually, the Baruch 
Plan was dropped and the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 remained in 
place as official U.S. proliferation policy. 
Thus, early U.S. postwar proliferation policy can best be 
described as follows: 
To stop the spread of nuclear weapons before it 
even  started  by  maintaining  tight  government 
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control over all nuclear activity in the United 
States. [Ref. 10] 
2.  The Treaties: Atoms for Peace to START 
In 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb, 
and the arms race commenced. The United States undertook 
development of the Hydrogen bomb and successfully tested one 
in 1952. Subsequently, the Soviets successfully detonated a 
Hydrogen bomb in 1953. Meanwhile, both countries focused on 
the development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBM's) and long range intercontinental bombers capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons. By 1953 the Cold War policy of 
mutual deterrence was at its highest point and was epitomized 
in President Dwight D. Eisenhower's defense policy of massive 
retaliation, which proposed that any Soviet or communist 
aggression against the United States could result in large 
scale nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union. 
Although Eisenhower endorsed and supported the policy 
known as massive retaliation, he was very concerned with the 
threat of nuclear war and well aware of the potential 
catastrophic consequences associated with such a war. In 
December 1953, Eisenhower presented his Atoms For Peace 
proposal to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The 
essence of the proposal was gradual nuclear disarmament and 
for the United States and the Soviet Union to focus on 
exploring the potential peaceful applications and uses of 
nuclear energy. The plan originally intended for the United 
States and the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear stockpiles 
through contributions to an international agency that would 
use the fissile material released to promote the development 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a system of 
international controls. [Ref. 11] 
The proposal was received with resounding enthusiasm in 
the United Nations. However, to say that Atoms For Peace was 
unsuccessful would be an overstatement.  The commitment to 
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disarm was very weak in both the United States and the Soviet 
Union. In fact, during President Eisenhower's Administration 
(1953-1960), U.S. nuclear weapons increased in number from 
1,000 to 18,700, and the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal grew 
from 50 to 1,700. [Ref. 12] 
Some believe that one positive outcome of the Atoms For 
Peace proposal was the eventual establishment of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA was 
primarily charged with assisting in the dissemination of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, promoting nuclear 
safety, and administering a system of international nuclear 
safeguards. An opposing view holds that the Atoms For Peace 
plan unwittingly contributed to the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons by freely providing nuclear technology to non-nuclear 
countries. [Ref. 13] 
The Cuban missile crisis (19 62) was probably the 
strongest test of U.S. - Soviet Union relations during the 
Cold War. After learning that the Soviet Union was building 
bases capable of deploying medium range nuclear missiles in 
Cuba, President Kennedy put U.S. nuclear forces on alert and 
blockaded Cuba. This close encounter with the Soviet Union 
reemphasized the risks of the arms race, the dangers of the 
continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and the reality of 
the potential for nuclear war. This period of the Cold War 
saw the deployment of submarines capable of launching long 
range nuclear missiles by both the Soviet Union and the United 
States. Due to the massive buildup of both countries' nuclear 
arsenals, and thereby the Soviet Union's capability to 
retaliate against the United States, the defense policy of 
massive retaliation became less credible. Kennedy adopted a 
strategy of deterrence known as flexible response. This 
policy included a range of appropriate responses, conventional 
and nuclear, to all levels of aggression. [Ref. 14] 
Although the arms race continued to accelerate in the 
12 
1960's, there was significant progress made in the signing of 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963. The Limited Test 
Ban Treaty prohibited nuclear testing on land, at sea and in 
the atmosphere. Underground testing was not banned. The LTBT 
was a significant advancement in the nonproliferation regime 
and was effective in stemming the spread of nuclear weapons to 
non-nuclear weapon states. [Ref. 15] Notable 
exceptions were China which successfully tested a nuclear 
explosive in 1964 and India which successfully tested a 
nuclear explosive in 1974. 
Another step taken towards nonproliferation in the 1960's 
was the Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 
Latin America (Tlatelolco). This treaty established the 
world's first nuclear weapon free zone. The treaty forbade 
the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons in Latin 
America and prohibited their deployment there by foreign 
powers. [Ref. 16] 
Probably the most significant step taken towards 
nonproliferation in the 1960's was the completion of the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The treaty was 
signed by the first three nuclear powers, the United States, 
Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, as well as 59 non-nuclear 
countries. The treaty called for the non-nuclear countries 
not to develop nuclear weapons, and for the nuclear powers to 
assist them in their peaceful nuclear energy progress. 
Additionally, the treaty called for the nuclear powers to 
negotiate reductions in their nuclear arsenals. 
[Ref. 17] 
By 1969 the Soviet Union's buildup of forces and nuclear 
weapons had brought them to what President Richard Nixon 
recognized as strategic parity. [Ref. 18] Nixon 
clearly recognized the Soviet Union as a formidable opponent 
and understood the importance of strategic (nuclear) arms 
control.  During President Nixon's Administration there were 
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several achievements in nuclear nonproliferation policy 
efforts.  These included the Antiballistic Missile Treaty 
(1972) which prohibited the United States and the Soviet Union 
from deploying more than two Antiballistic Missile Systems 
(systems designed to intercept the other's ballistic missiles) 
[Ref. 19] ,  and  the  Strategic  Arms  Limitation  Talks 
(1972) which froze U.S and Soviet strategic missile launchers 
at the number deployed at the time of the agreement. The 
agreement was intended to remain in place for five years, 
until   a   more   detailed   treaty   was   negotiated. 
[Ref. 20] 
The SALT II Treaty was finally completed and signed by 
President Carter in 1979. As intended, the treaty was more 
complex and detailed than SALT I. It mandated equal limits of 
2250 total land and submarine based ballistic missile 
launchers and long range, nuclear armed bombers. 
Additionally, it placed numerical limits on their strategic 
weapons. [Ref. 21] SALT II was never ratified by 
Congress, but both the United States and the Soviet Union 
adhered to its limitations. Thus, SALT represented the primary 
set of constraints on the proliferation of strategic nuclear 
weapons in the 1980's. Although President Ronald Reagan 
opposed the SALT II Treaty, feeling that the United States was 
falling behind the Soviet Union in the nuclear competition, he 
abided by its limitations throughout his Presidency. 
Additionally, President Reagan initiated what is known as the 
Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (1982). The Soviet Union 
rejected all initial proposals during these talks, primarily 
because they called for deeper cuts in the Soviet arsenal than 
in the U.S arsenal. Consequently, no progress was made with 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks during President Reagan's 
Administration. 
Perhaps President Reagan's most familiar contribution to 
nonproliferation efforts was the Strategic Defense Initiative 
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(SDI) which aimed at developing space based antiballistic 
missile systems that would render nuclear weapons obsolete. 
SDI was a very controversial initiative that came under heavy 
criticism concerning both cost and effectiveness. 
Additionally, critics argued that rather than render nuclear 
weapons obsolete, such a defense system would contribute to 
proliferation by encouraging the further expansion of nuclear 
missile arsenals in order to maintain retaliatory capability. 
Other critics pointed out that SDI would violate the 1972 
Antiballistic Missile Treaty which limited the number of 
Antiballistic Missile Systems the United States and the Soviet 
Union could deploy to two. [Ref. 22] 
In 1987, President Reagan helped to establish the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This was primarily an 
export control agreement among several Western nations which 
arose out of the recognition that the control of missile 
technology was a very important part of nonproliferation 
policy. The MTCR agreement was designed to control the 
proliferation of all missile systems capable of exceeding 
300km in range and 500kg in payload. The idea was to prevent 
third world nations' access to the technology which would 
allow them to attain the capability to develop missiles that 
exceeded the established thresholds. [Ref. 23] This 
was perhaps the most significant contribution to 
nonproliferation efforts made by the Reagan Administration. 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks were re-initiated 
between President George Bush and Soviet General Secretary 
Gorbachev in 1989-90 and the START Treaty was signed in July 
1991. The significance of the START Treaty was that it was 
the first arms control agreement in history to require actual 
reductions in strategic (nuclear) offensive forces. Additional 
agreements were made between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 
the area of arms reduction despite the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in the fall of 1991. 
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E.  OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
Thus far this thesis has focused solely on the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is largely due to the 
fact that nuclear weapons have been the primary proliferation 
concern since the beginning of the nuclear age during World 
War II. 
However, the proliferation of other types of weapons of 
mass destruction, namely biological and chemical weapons, has 
increasingly become of concern in recent years. This is due 
primarily to the tremendous advances being made in the field 
of biotechnology, as well as the increasingly worldwide 
availability of advanced technology in other sciences that 
make it more and more possible for countries to develop, store 
and deliver biological and chemical weapons. It is therefore 
appropriate to mention and briefly discuss the primary efforts 
in place to stop or control the proliferation of biological 
and chemical weapons. 
1.  Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions 
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is officially 
called the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The document was 
signed in 1972 and put into force three years later. By 1991 
110 countries had signed the treaty. The essence of the BWC 
is rooted in the Protocol of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare signed in Geneva in 1925. [Ref. 24] 
The purpose of the BWC was to reaffirm the Geneva 
Protocol and to strengthen it by prohibiting the development, 
production,  stockpiling and acquisition of chemical and 
biological agents for the purpose of producing weapons. 
[Ref. 25] 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was signed in 1993 
16 
and is expected to be in force by 1995. Similar to the BWC, 
the CWC seeks to ban the production and stockpiling of 
chemical agents for the purpose of producing weapons and the 
destruction of existing weapons and agents. [Ref. 26] 
These two treaties suffer the same inherent drawback as 
the NPT; they do not ban or prohibit the development of most 
of the biological and chemical agents as long as there is some 
medical or scientific purpose. The burden, therefore, becomes 
the very difficult if not impossible task of monitoring 
through some form of an international agency. 
F.  SUMMARY 
It is evident that U.S. proliferation policy over the 
past fifty (50) years has focused on the nonproliferation of 
nuclear weapons, and that the efforts were primarily aimed at 
the Soviet Union. The interesting thing is that for the most 
part nonproliferation efforts were successful in preventing 
the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries (China, 
India, Israel, Pakistan and South Africa being the 
exceptions), yet largely unsuccessful in preventing the 
tremendous build-up of the United States' and Soviet Union's 
nuclear arsenals. 
It appears that proliferation policy efforts over the 
past fifty (50) years conceptually fall into one of two 
categories or paradigms; the first being concerned with the 
prevention of non-nuclear weapon states from attaining nuclear 
weapon capability at all, and the second with allowing, even 
assisting non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear 
technology and capability as long as there are assurances 
through monitoring and inspections that there is no intent to 
use that capability to produce weapons. Past nonproliferation 
efforts could then be categorized as follows under these 
paradigms: 
17 
Concern With Capability 
1946 Atomic Energy Act 
Baruch Plan 
LTBT 
Concern With Intent 
Atoms For Peace 
Creation Of IAEA 
Tlatelolco 
NPT, CWC, BWC 
The challenge for the remainder of the 1990's and the 
next century in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union 
is to decide what paradigm is appropriate to operate under in 
the new world order. It may very well be that a combination 
of both paradigms is appropriate, or a that completely new and 
different paradigm and way of thinking is necessary to 
continue to successfully control the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in this new and 
very changed and unstable world. 
In the next chapter, the idea of counterproliferation in 
addition to nonproliferation measures will be discussed. 
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III.  CODNTERPROLIFERATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter will present a background of the 
proliferation situation as it was early on in President 
Clinton's Administration. It will then discuss the 
Administration's new concerns in the wake of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Next, 
counterproliferation and the Defense Counterproliferation 
Initiative will be discussed in terms of a shift in emphasis 
in proliferation policy. Finally, a summary of the chapter 
will review key points and position the thesis to enter the 
next chapter dealing with the budget and resource implications 
of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction was on the front burner very 
early in the Clinton Presidency. In the words of Secretary of 
State to be Warren Christopher: 
We must work assiduously with other nations to 
discourage   proliferation   through improved 
intelligence,   export   controls, incentives, 
sanctions  and  even  force  when necessary. 
[Ref. 27] 
Following is a partial listing of important proliferation 
issues and events faced by President Clinton within his first 
year in office: 
• January 7, 1993 the 22 countries of the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) revised the agreement 
to restrict the transfer of missiles intended for the 
delivery of all weapons of mass destruction regardless 
of their range and payload. [Ref. 28] 
• January 1993 the Administration proposes a cut of $2.5 
billion  ($6.3  billion to  $3.8  billion)  for the 
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Strategie Defense Initiative. [Ref. 29] 
• February 15, 1993 North Korea refused an IAEA request 
for a special inspection of two suspected nuclear 
related facilities. This refusal violates the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and raises fears that N. 
Korea is still pursuing a nuclear weapons program. 
[Ref. 30] 
• March 12, 1993 North Korea threatens to withdraw from 
the NPT. [Ref. 31] 
• March 24, 1993 South African President F.W. De Klerk 
revealed that South Africa had assembled six (6) 
nuclear weapons prior to 1990. [Ref. 32] 
• April 3-4, 1993 President Clinton and Boris Yeltsin 
meet at the Vancouver Summit. Among other things they 
spoke of new agreements regarding the Safety, Security 
and Dismantlement (SSD) talks committing new "Nunn- 
Lugar" security assistance to Moscow. 
[Ref. 33] 
• May 13, 1993 former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
announced the renaming and refocusing of the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI). The Strategic Defense 
Initiative Organization was renamed the Ballistic 
Missile Defense Organization. The new organization 
will shift focus away from spaced based systems toward 
the development of land based missile defense systems. 
[Ref. 34] 
• June 11, 1993 North Korea agrees to suspend its 
announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT). In doing so, N. Korea accepts routine 
inspections of declared facilities. [Ref. 35] 
• September 1993, soon-to-be Prime Minister of Pakistan, 
Benazir Bhutto announces that Pakistan's nuclear 
program "... will be continued because Pakistan cannot 
allow India to have an atom bomb while we stay out of 
the running." [Ref. 36] 
• January 14, 1994 Ukraine, Russia and the United States 
in a trilateral statement announce that the Ukraine has 
agreed to eliminate all nuclear weapons in its 
territory. [Ref. 37] 
Although not nearly a comprehensive list of all of the 
proliferation/nonproliferation activity that took place during 
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the first year of Clinton's Administration, it is a good 
indicator that the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction is a high profile issue 
which will demand much of the Administration's attention. 
In fact, on September 27, 1993 President Clinton signed 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 13) reaffirming the 
United States' continued support for a strong and effective 
nonproliferation regime. In his memorandum, President Clinton 
emphasized and outlined the importance of utilizing all 
available means to accomplish the objectives of the 
nonproliferation regime. The specific guidance given to the 
Department of Defense was of particular interest: 
We will give proliferation a higher profile in our 
intelligence collection and analysis and defense 
planning, and ensure that our force structure and 
military planning address the potential threat from 
weapons of mass destruction and missiles around the 
world. [Ref. 38] 
Later that year, in a speech at the National Academy of 
Sciences, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin described 
President Clinton's new guidance on nonproliferation as a new 
mission for the Department of Defense and announced the 
Department's Defense Counterproliferation Initiative: 
To respond to the President, we have created the 
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. With this 
initiative, we are making the essential change 
demanded by this increased threat. We are adding 
the task of protection to the task of prevention. 
[Ref. 39] 
C.  A NEW PROLIFERATION CONCERN 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the 
Cold War, the problem of the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
has become greatly complicated. With the end of the Cold War 
came an end to the threat that had dominated United States 
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defense strategy for the past fifty (50) years. No longer is 
the policy of "mutual deterrence" between the United States 
and the Soviet Union sufficient to control the global spread 
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 
The change in the global situation since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union prompted the Department of Defense to conduct 
what is called the Bottom Up Review in the summer of 1993 to 
assess the new threats posed to the national security of the 
United States in the new world order. The Bottom Up Review 
identified four (4) chief threats to the security of the 
United States. First and foremost on the list of threats was 
the new danger posed by the increased threat of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Arguments used to support 
this assessment are as follows: 
1. The existence of the former Soviet Union's nuclear 
arsenal. 
2. The arsenal is no longer under the control of one 
state (the Soviet Union) but several states. Russia, 
Belarus, Ukraine and Kazikhstan all have possession of 
nuclear weapons. (See the table [Ref. 40] 
on the following page depicting nuclear assets in the 
states of the former Soviet Union). 
3. The potential exists for nuclear weapons, material or 
technology to enter the black market. 
4. Nuclear expertise (former Soviet scientists) could be 
available for hire. 
5. The control that the former Soviet Union used to have 
over other countries with ambitions to obtain nuclear 
weapons, e.g., North Korea, is greatly diminished if 
not gone. [Ref. 41] 
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Table 2: Nuclear Assets 
of the Soviet Successor States 
Member. Nuclear Sup- 
ptiers Group (NSG) 


























a. The two Armenian reactors were shut down in 1989 for safety reasons, but the Armenian government is 
planning to restart Ihem despite local and international opposition. 
b. The IRT-M Minsk research reactor was shut down in 1988. 
c. The IRT-M Tbilisi research reactor was shut down in 1990. 
d. A uranium enrichment facility, of at least an experimental nature, possibly operated at Navoi during the 
1970s and 1980s. 
e. A hot cell is reportedly located at the Semipalatinsk test site. 
f. Although one report of an Armenian heavy water site has appeared in print, there has been no additional 
confirmation. 
g. The Ulbinsky Metallurgy Plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk produces beryllium and possibly zirconium. 
h. Zirconium, hafnium and ion exchange resins are produced in Ukraine at the Pridneprovsky Chemical Fac- 
tory 
Sourer. William C. Poller and Eve E. G<he*. Nuclear Assets of the Former Solid Union. October 1992. 
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The essence of the threat is best described in former 
Secretary of Defense Aspin's own words: 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction in the hands of 
potential adversaries is not a new problem, but 
with the end of the Cold War and the worldwide 
spread of technology, it has grown into a serious 
new threat to our nation's security... 
[Ref. 42] 
These sentiments were later echoed by present Secretary of 
Defense William Perry: 
I know of no problem with which the Department of 
Defense will be confronted more important than the 
problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. [Ref. 43] 
The threat of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of 
militaristic states such as North Korea, Iraq and Libya is not 
only a sobering one but a real one. In August 1994 in the 
city of Kaliningrad, Russian police interrupted the sale of a 
130 pound container holding highly radioactive material. Also 
in 1994 there were several instances in Germany where smuggled 
cases of bomb grade nuclear material have been found. There 
are strong indications that most of this nuclear material is 
being smuggled out of Russia and other states of the former 
Soviet Union. [Ref. 44] 
Secretary Aspin presented a strong case for treating 
proliferation as a new threat. That combined with the 
corroborating incidents described above suggests that the 
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative is perhaps a necessary 
and timely policy development. 
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D.  THE DEFENSE COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE 
1.      Counterproliferation and the Defense 
Counterproliteration Initiative 
A clarification of terms is necessary at this juncture. 
Secretary   Aspin   first   used   the   title   Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative in his speech to the Committee 
on International Security and Arms Control at the National 
Academy of Sciences on December 7, 1993. The relevant excerpt 
from that speech appears on page 21 of this thesis.  In that 
speech he made  it very  clear that what  the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative does is add protection from 
the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons  of  mass  destruction  as  a major policy  goal. 
[Ref. 45] 
Subsequent  to  that  speech,   the  generic  term 
counterproliferation was coined and defined by the Clinton 
Administration to mean the following: 
Counterproliferation - the activities of the 
Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. 
efforts to combat proliferation, including 
diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and 
intelligence collection and analysis, with 
particular responsibility for assuring U.S. forces 
and interests can be protected should they confront 
an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction 
or missiles. [Ref. 46] 
This definition of counterproliferation appears to 
encompass the definition of nonproliferation in addition to 
the new element of protection that Secretary Aspin describes 
as the goal of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. 
The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative deals only with 
the last part of the above definition for 
counterproliferation, namely those elements that deal with 
protection. 
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Explained        another        way, the        following        chart 
[Ref.   47] illustrates        the        full        range        of        DOD's 
activities in the Administration's proliferation policy 
efforts. Taken    as    a    whole,     the    chart    represents    the 
Administration's definition of counterproliferation. It is 
the right side of the chart, under the heading of Protection 
and marked as a Special POD Responsibility that represents 
what Secretary Aspin described as the Defense 
Counterproliferation  Initiative. 
Part II Defense Initiatives 
COUNTERPROLIFERATION AND THREAT REDUCTION 
Responding to the Proliferation Threat 
^t^^^ Prevention ^ Protection ► ^•^^^^^^ ^•T^^"" 
Internationa! 
Dissuasion Denial Arms Control Pressure Defusing Deterrence Offense Defense 
Emphasizmo economic. Export controls NPT, BWC. CWC. Sanctions Cooperative Smalt nuclear Underground TMD 
political, ana military dismantlement arsenals structures 
costs of proliferation Interdiction Nuclear free zones Isolation 
Safety tnd CW Scud 
BW vaccmes 
Positive/negative Disruption of Confidence Publicizing violations secunty hunting Strategic and 
secunty assurance and supply networks Secunty enhancements BW tactical warning 
guarantees Building Intelligence sharing Contamination 
Measures to persuaoe others Stabilizing Undeterrabtes problems Uncovenrional 
Secunty assistance 
Porting beck 
of the danger measures delivery. 
count en enonsm 












Special DoD Responsibility 
1 ^ 
DoD Shares Interagency Responsibility 
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Protection is defined as those strategies that: 
"... seek to convince the state that its own 
interests are best served by not using these 
weapons and ideally, choosing at some point to roll 
back and eliminate the capability that they have 
acquired. [Ref. 48] 
The underlying premise of this thesis was that there was 
a shift in proliferation policy emphasis on the part of the 
Clinton Administration to add counterproliferation measures as 
outlined in the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. For 
this reason, the remainder of this thesis will concern itself 
exclusively with the substance and budget and resource 
implications of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, 
and not with the traditional nonproliferation elements 
included under the definition of the generic term 
counterproliferation. 
2.  The Substance of the Initiative 
It should be understood from the outset that the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative in no way replaces policies or 
initiatives previously developed in dealing with the issue of 
nonproliferation. Rather, it complements and supports those 
efforts.  The Secretary of Defense makes it very clear that: 
the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction remains the preeminent goal of U.S. 
proliferation efforts. [Ref. 49] 
The underlying theme of the Defense Counterproliferation 
Initiative is the recognition that the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is 
likely to still occur. Thus, the addition of protection as a 
major policy goal is best summed up as follows: 
The commitment to greatly improve capabilities to 
protect U.S. forces from a regional opponent with 
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weapons of mass destruction. [Ref. 50] 
Secretary  of  Defense Aspin  separated  the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative into five elements: 
1. Creation of the new mission by the President. 
2. Changing what we buy to meet the new threat. 
3. Planning to fight war differently. 
4. Changing how we collect intelligence, and what 
intelligence we collect. 
5. Doing  all  these  things  with  our  allies. 
[Ref. 51] 
Secretary Aspin further broke down these five elements 
into what appears to be the real substance of the initiative: 
• Develop and procure improved non-nuclear penetrating 
munitions to deal with [enemy] underground 
installations. 
• Find better ways to hunt mobile missiles such as SCUDs. 
• Reorient the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) into 
the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to 
concentrate on responding to theater ballistic missile 
threats. 
• Clarify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow for 
the development and testing of theater missile defense 
systems to meet a real threat without undermining the 
treaty. 
• Direct the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and 
the Commanders in Chiefs to develop a military planning 
process for dealing with adversaries who have nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. 
• Establish a new Deputy Director for Military Support in 
the Intelligence Community's Nonproliferation Center, 
and tripling the number of Department of Defense 
experts assigned to the Center. 
• Increase alliance efforts against proliferation. 
[Ref. 52] 
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The position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear 
Security and Counterproliteration (ASD(NS&CP)) was created to 
assure that the issues received proper visibility. 
[Ref. 53] 
It appears that former Secretary of Defense Aspin had a 
clear vision of what he perceived the Department of Defense's 
new mission to be regarding proliferation policy. The 
elements of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative seem 
to be clearly focused on the idea of adding protection as a 
major proliferation policy goal. 
E.  SUMMARY 
This chapter showed that the issue of the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction 
remains one of extreme importance and significance to 
President Clinton's Administration. In fact, the 
Administration recognizes it as a new threat in the post Cold 
War era. 
Although former Secretary of Defense Aspin, and present 
Secretary Perry seem focused on the purpose of the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative, there appears to be some 
ambiguity regarding the Administration's definition of the 
generic term counterproliferation and the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative. The thesis will not concern 
itself further with the "nonproliferation" elements of 
counterproliferation. Rather, the thesis will focus on the 
budget and resource implications of the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative as it was originally requested 
by the President in his FY 95 defense budget and how it fared 
as it passed through the Congressional budget process. 
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IV. CONGRESS AND THE DEFENSE COUNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE 
A. OVERVIEW 
As stated earlier, the Defense Counterproliteration 
Initiative originated in DOD in response to the President's 
identification of a new mission for DOD regarding the issue of 
the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and other 
weapons of mass destruction. Although originally termed the 
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI) by Secretary 
Aspin, funding was originally requested in the FY 95 defense 
budget within the defense-wide Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
account under the category "Washington Headquarters Services, " 
with $30.3 million earmarked for "counterproliferation 
studies." [Ref. 54] 
The analysis in this chapter will focus on congressional 
treatment of the request as it moved through the congressional 
budget process. Emphasis will be placed on the changes made 
to the request by the House and Senate Armed Services 
Committees and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. 
B. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 
It will be helpful at this point to review the 
congressional budget process. As required by the 
Congressional Budget Act of 19 74, the President transmits his 
budget to Congress in January/February each calendar year for 
the next budget fiscal year which begins on October first 
(1st) . For example, the President submitted his budget for FY 
1995, which commenced 1 October 1994, to Congress on February 
7, 1994. [Ref. 55] 
Once submitted to Congress, the House and Senate Budget 
Committees each review the proposal and forward draft budget 
resolutions to the full House and Senate for debate. A 
concurrent budget resolution is then passed which provides 
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allocations to all committees for the budget year. The 
concurrent budget resolution does not indicate how dollars are 
to be spent, nor does it make funds available. In the case of 
the defense budget, the committees responsible for shaping the 
defense budget and actually appropriating dollars are the 
House and Senate Armed Services Committees and the House and 
Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, respectively. 
The House and Senate Armed Services Committees identify 
specific programs to be funded within the total budget for 
defense in the concurrent budget resolution, and authorize 
spending ceilings within each program. The resulting House 
and Senate Defense Authorization Bills are then passed by the 
respective chambers of Congress. Differences are resolved in 
conference, and the resulting agreement must then pass both 
the House and the Senate. The President then signs or vetoes 
the conference agreement on defense authorization. The 
Authorization Bill allows DOD to appropriate funds but does 
not make funds available. That happens during the 
appropriations process. 
The House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees 
are responsible for developing defense spending floors based 
on the concurrent budget resolution and the Defense 
Authorization Bill. Once passed on the floors of the House 
and Senate, the resulting appropriations bills are taken into 
conference. The Defense Appropriations Conference Agreement 
that emerges is voted on in both the House and Senate and 
forwarded to the President for signature or veto. The passage 
of the Defense Appropriations Bill for DOD makes funds 
available for the next fiscal year. 
It is important to understand that the authorization and 
appropriations committees are very powerful and influence the 
budget tremendously. Their actions determine how much money 
will be made available annually to DOD, and on what the money 
will be spent.  In other words, these committees provide both 
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policy oversight and funding authority for all DOD programs. 
[Ref. 56] [Ref. 57] 
C. THE DEFENSE CODNTERPROLIFERATION INITIATIVE AND THE 
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS 
In February, 1994 the President released his FY 1995 
defense budget request.  The budget proposed: 
...about $30 million for policy support to the DOD- 
wide Counterproliferation Initiative, to help halt 
and respond to the spread of nuclear weapons and 
other   weapons   of   mass   destruction. 
[Ref. 58] 
The original request was significantly changed by the defense 
committees of Congress. To better understand the reasons and 
implications of the changes to the original request it will be 
helpful to follow the request through each step in the 
Congressional budget process. 
1.  The Authorization Process 
a. The Senate 
As stated earlier, the original request was included 
as a $30.3 million item in the defense-wide O&M account under 
Washington Headquarters Services, earmarked for 
counterproliferation studies. The original budget request did 
not contain a specific line item called the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI). However, during the 
authorization process the Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC) almost zeroed the amount earmarked for 
counterproliferation studies within the O&M Washington 
Headquarters Services account by recommending a $29.3 million 
"counterproliferation transfer" from that account. The SASC 
recommended the transfer as follows: $12.5 million to the 
defense-wide research and development account earmarked 
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specifically for the POD Counterproliferation Initiative and 
$15 million to the Advanced Research Projects Agency for two 
counterproliferation technology projects. The remainder was 
left in the O&M account. The SASC also authorized the 
transfer of up to an additional $100 million for 
counterproliferation technology projects. 
(See Tables 3 and 4.)  [Ref. 59] [Ref. 60] 
Table 3: Senate Authorization Action on Counterproliferation Studies 
(dollars in thousands) 
O&M Account Budget Committee Senate Change from 
Request Change Authorized Budget 
Request 






Table 4: Senate Authorization Action on DCI (dollars in thousands) 
RDT&E Account Budget Committee Senate Change 
Request Change Authorized from 
Budget 
Request 





Jb. The House 
The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) apparently 
did not make any changes to the original budget request for 
$30.3 million in the defense-wide O&M Washington Headquarters 
Services account earmarked for counterproliferation studies, 
nor did they add any funds to defense-wide RDT&E specifically 
for the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative. 
(See Tables 5 and 6.) [Ref. 61] 
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Table 5: House Authorization Action on Counterproliferation Studies 
(thousands of dollars) 















30,300 0 30,300 0 
Table 6: House Authorization Action on DCI (dollars in thousands) 














0 0 0 0 
c.     Conference       Report 
Authorization 
on National       Defense 
The final phase of the authorization process is the 
conference agreement which works out the differences between 
the Senate and House passed version of the National Defense 
Authorization Act. Interestingly, in conference the House 
seems to have gone along with the Senate in both decreasing 
the amount for counterproliferation studies in the O&M account 
(although the amount of the decrease was lessened to $28.3 
million), and supporting the DOD Counterproliferation 
Initiative in the RDT&E account. In fact, the amount for the 
DOD Counterproliferation Initiative was increased to $16.5 
million in the authorization conference agreement. The 
Conference Report stated: 
The conferees agree to authorize $16.5 million in 
defense-wide research and development accounts for 
counterproliferation activities identified by the 
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Joint Review Committee as defense technology gaps. 
[Ref.   62] 
Tables     7     and     8     illustrate     the     changes     made     in     the 
authorization conference report.    [Ref.   63] 
Table 7:  Authorization Conference Action on Counterproliferation Studies 
(dollars   in  thousands) 














30,300 1,000 30,300 2,000 
Table  8:   Authorization Conference Action on DCI   (dollars  in  thousands) 












0 12,500 0 16,500 
2.     The Appropriations  Process 
In the appropriations phase of  the  congressional budget 
process,    the   authorization   bill    is    reviewed,    changed   and 
approved by the Senate and House Appropriations  Committees   - 
Defense Subcommittees   (SAC-D and HAC-D,   respectively). 
a.     The Senate 
The SAC-D agreed with the Senate version of the 
authorization bill regarding counterproliferation studies, 
stating: 
...a reduction of $30,300,000 to the Department's 
request for counterproliferation studies and 
related programs is made.     Funding for this program 
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is addressed in the RDT&E section of this report. 
[Ref. 64] 
Additionally, the SAC-D significantly increased the amount for 
the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative under RDT&E, approving 
$80 million.  Specifically, the SAC report stated: 
DOD Counterproliferation Initiative - The committee 
provides $80,000,000 to initiate a coordinated 
research and development program which adapts 
existing defense technologies and, where necessary, 
develops new technologies to provide the United 
States with the ability to detect, monitor, and 
deter the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction...The committee believes these funds 
can most efficiently and expeditiously be 
administered by ARPA. [Ref. 65] 
(See Tables 9 and 10.) [Ref. 66] 
Table 9: Senate 
Studies 
Appropriations Action on Counterproliferation 
(thousands of dollars) 
















30,300 (30,300) 0 (30,300) 
Table 10: Senate Appropriations Action on DC 
(thousands of dollars) 
I 















0 80,000 80,000 +80,000 
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b.     The House 
The HAC-D agreed with the SAC-D regarding the 
Washington Headquarters Services O&M account earmarked for 
counterproliteration studies, stating very clearly that: 
Within the Washington Headquarters Services request 
for Fiscal Year 1995 is $30,159,000 for several 
counterproliferation initiatives. While the 
committee fully supports the counterproliferation 
programs of the Department of Defense, these 
particular programs not only appear to duplicate 
requests made in other accounts, the activities for 
which funds are requested are for research and 
development or procurement functions that are not 
appropriately financed with operation and 
maintenance resources. Consequently, the entire 
$30,159.000 has been deleted. (emphasis added) 
[Ref. 67] 
Although the SAC-D and HAC-D amounts identified under 
Washington Headquarters Services for counterproliferation 
programs differ slightly ($30.3 million and $30.159 million, 
respectively) , it appears that they are referring to the same 
pot of money (perhaps the HAC-D did not include all of the 
same programs under counterproliferation initiatives that the 
SAC-D included under counterproliferation studies). The 
important thing here is that both the SAC-D and HAC-D agree 
that O&M is not the appropriate account to fund the DOD 
Counterproliferation Initiative. 
However, whereas the SAC-D increased the $16.5 
million authorized in the authorization conference report to 
$80 million, the HAC-D did not make any appropriation under 
RDT&E for the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative, even after 
deleting the $30,159,00 for counterproliferation studies in 
the O&M account.  (See Tables 11 and 12.) [Ref. 68] 
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Table 11: House Appropriations Action on Counterproliteration 
Studies (dollars in thousands) 
















30,300 (30,159) 141 (30,159) 
Table 12: House Appropriations Action on DCI 
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c. Conference Report on Department of Defense 
Appropriations 
The final step in the appropriations process is 
reconciling of differences between the Senate and House 
versions of the appropriations bills. This is done in 
conference and appears in the appropriations conference 
report. 
As stated earlier, the SAC-D and HAC-D essentially- 
agreed on the deletion of the almost $30 million from the O&M 
Washington Headquarters Services account. In conference, they 
reconciled their slight difference in dollar amounts and 
deleted the entire $30.3 million from the account. 
However, what happened with the DOD 
Counterproliferation Initiative is rather interesting. The 
Senate increased the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative 
throughout the entire congressional budget process, finally 
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appropriating $80 million for it under defense-wide RDT&E. On 
the other hand, the HASC didn't authorize funds and the HAC-D 
didn't appropriate any funds for the DOD Counterproliteration 
Initiative. In conference, the $80 million was decreased to 
$60 million.  (See Tables 13 and 14.) [Ref. 69] 
Table 13: Appropriations Conference Action on 


















Table 14: Appropriations Conference Action on DCI 

















D.  SUMMARY 
After tracking the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative 
through the congressional budget process, several things are 
evident. First, there is a lot of interest in Congress 
regarding the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative. This is 
indicated by the magnitude of some of the changes made to the 
budget request. Also, there appears to be some confusion or 
ambiguity, similar to that described in Chapter III but in a 
budgeting context, regarding the generic term 
counterproliferation  and  the  DOD  Counterproliferation 
40 
Initiative. The ambiguity is such that both houses of 
Congress felt that the Administration had counterproliferation 
inappropriately funded under O&M, and led the House to delete 
and not support the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative or any 
other counterproliferation program until the authorization and 
appropriations conference agreements. 
The Senate, however, supported the DOD 
Counterproliferation Initiative from the very beginning of the 
budget process. Although they zeroed the O&M account for 
counterproliferation studies, they added back more than double 
that amount, $80 million, under RDT&E. 
The budgeting and resourcing implications of the DOD 
Counterproliferation Initiative as highlighted throughout the 
congressional budget process are significant. Inferences, 
insights and conclusions regarding the budgeting and 
resourcing implications of counterproliferation and the DOD 




V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis has presented an historical review of U.S. 
proliferation policy since the dawn of the nuclear age during 
World War II through the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
end of the Cold War era. It also presented a substantive 
analysis of the Clinton Administration's Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative, as well as a financial 
analysis of the $30.3 million FY 1995 budget request for 
policy support for that initiative. The purpose of the 
historical review of U.S. proliferation policy was to provide 
the context and perspective in which proliferation policy was 
shaped during the bipolar Cold War period when the United 
States and the Soviet Union practiced the policy which came to 
be known as "mutual deterrence" to control the spread of 
nuclear weapons. The analysis of the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative was conducted to investigate 
a new element in proliferation policy in the post Cold War 
period, one focused on protection from the continued 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction. The financial analysis of the budget request 
provided insight to help assess the budgeting and resource 
implications of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. 
A.  PROBLEMS WITH PROLIFERATION POLICY 
The moment Hiroshima was destroyed by an atomic bomb, the 
future of war fighting was changed forever. With the dawn of 
the nuclear age came a force so powerful that the outcome of 
a war could be decided by one bomb, leaving nothing but 
complete destruction in its wake. This strategic capability 
understandably caused great concern, if not panic, throughout 
the world as well as in the United States. The rest of the 
world was concerned with their vulnerability to a nuclear 
attack,  and the United States was concerned with the 
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possibility of other countries, especially adversaries, 
attaining nuclear weapons capability. Therein lies the 
fundamental concern underlying the history proliferation 
policy. 
The history of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
nuclear proliferation policy, is best described as an 
adversarial relationship between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, perhaps best characterized by distrust and fear. 
Perhaps it was this bipolar balance of power structure, much 
more so than the negotiated treaties and agreements discussed 
earlier in this thesis, that helped minimize the global spread 
of nuclear weapons (exceptions previously noted), and create 
an international environment relatively "comfortable" with the 
status of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought an end 
to the bipolar international balance of power that had existed 
for nearly fifty (50) years, and introduced new issues and 
concerns regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction. President Clinton's 
Administration identified these new issues and concerns and 
added a new strategy to deal with them; this was called the 
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. The new initiative 
emphasizes protection from the continued proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and 
identifies protection as a major policy goal. 
B.  PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION AND FINDINGS 
This thesis discusses several issues regarding 
nonproliferation and counterproliferation as outlined in the 
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. In doing so, it 
addresses the primary and subsidiary questions. The primary 
research question asked was: 
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• How did Congress change or otherwise impact the 
President's FY 1995 defense budget request for funding 
in support of the Defense Counterproliteration 
Initiative? 
The level of activity and magnitude of changes to the original 
request indicate that counterproliferation is an issue of high 
visibility within both the Administration and the Congress. 
However, there was some confusion and ambiguity from the 
very beginning of the budget process. When Secretary of 
Defense Aspin announced the Defense Counterproliferation 
Initiative back in December 1993, he clearly stated its 
purpose was to add protection from the continued proliferation 
of nuclear weapons as a major policy goal. After Aspin's 
speech, the generic term counterproliferation was coined by 
the Administration and appears to include the traditional 
definition of nonproliferation in addition to the new element 
of protection described by Secretary Aspin as the goal of the 
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative. There was additional 
confusion between the Administration and Congress regarding 
the level of funding and the appropriate funding account. The 
Administration requested approximately $30 million for 
counterproliferation studies in the defense-wide O&M account. 
Both the House and the Senate zeroed that account indicating 
that they felt the O&M account was not the appropriate account 
to fund the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative. 
What happened in Congress regarding the actual level of 
funding was also very interesting. The House apparently did 
not support the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative at 
all. As indicated above, they zeroed the Administration's 
request in the O&M account and did not add back any funds to 
any other accounts. On the other hand, the Senate appears to 
have strongly supported the new initiative. In fact, it was 
the Senate that added the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative 
as a specific line item in the budget under RDT&E.  What is 
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interesting, is that after authorizing just $12.5 million 
during the authorization process, the Senate significantly 
increased that amount during the appropriations process and 
appropriated $80 million for the DOD Counterproliferation 
Initiative. 
Ultimately, Congress appropriated $60 million for the DOD 
Counterproliferation Initiative under RDT&E. The implication 
here is that Congress treated the initiative as more of a 
technology oriented initiative requiring RDT&E funds to 
develop new and improved ways to provide protection from the 
threat of the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
This thesis provides insight into the shift in emphasis 
in proliferation policy from one focused primarily on 
deterrence, to a new concern with protection from the 
continued proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also 
identifies the role that Congress plays in shaping defense 
policy, specifically highlighting changes made to the Defense 
Counterproliferation  Initiative during  the  congressional 
budget process. 
Both the Administration and Congress seem to agree that 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction represents a new threat in the post Cold War era. 
They also appear to agree that in dealing with this new 
threat, proliferation policy needs to take on a new emphasis, 
namely protection from the continued proliferation of nuclear 
weapons as outlined in DOD's Counterproliferation Initiative. 
The Administration's approximately $30 million request for 
counterproliferation studies, and congressional approval of 
nearly twice this amount supports this conclusion. 
Additionally, the level of activity regarding the DOD 
Counterproliferation Initiative, both by the Administration 
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and Congress, indicates that the issue of the continued 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction is likely to remain a highly visible issue for the 
foreseeable future. 
D.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
In researching the primary thesis question, other 
questions and issues were raised. 
First, it would be interesting to track the flow of the 
$60 million appropriated for the DOD Counterproliferation 
Initiative to determine precisely what the funds were spent 
on. It would also be helpful to determine whether the funds 
were utilized to satisfy the elements described by former 
Secretary of Defense Les Aspin when he first announced the 
Defense Counterproliferation Initiative back in December of 
1993. 
Second, it may prove insightful to research why there was 
such an apparent difference in the treatment of the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative between the House and the 
Senate throughout the congressional budget process. 
Differences between the House and Senate on this issue may 
carry implications for the future of proliferation policy and 
future initiatives regarding counterproliferation. 
Finally, since the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative 
received considerable attention and budget activity throughout 
the congressional budget process, it would be useful to 
continue to follow the issue of counterproliferation 
throughout Fiscal Year 1995, and then do a similar analysis of 
any Fiscal Year 1996 budget requests for counterproliferation 
projects or initiatives. A comparison of outcomes could 
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